K. Sugiura (1) , K. Ito (1) , R. Yokoyama (2) , S. Kumagai (3) & T. Onodera This paper proposes a mathematical model to assess the risk of introduction of the BSE agent (release risk) into Japan through importation of animals, bone-in carcass meat and mammalian MBM.
The paper also describes the results of investigations to determine the source of introduction of the BSE agent, as well as measures taken to prevent the agent from entering into food and feed chains, after detection of cases of the disease in Japan in 2001.
Materials and methods

Basic assumptions used in the release assessment
The application of this BSE release assessment method is based on the assumption that BSE arose in the United Kingdom (UK) and was propagated through the recycling of inadequately processed BSE-infected bovine tissues into animal feed. Later, exportation of infected animals, infected meat products and infected MBM provided the means for the possible spread of the BSE agent to other countries in Europe, with infected MBM being the source of infection for the animals in these countries. Exports of contaminated products from these countries have led to further spread of the BSE agent to countries with no incidence of the disease.
Release assessment model
The release risk was assessed quantitatively by estimating the amount of infected MBM released following imports into Japan of infected live cattle, infected bone-in carcass meat and infected MBM between 1993 and 2000.
Based on scientific assessment, the authors considered that cattle semen and embryos can be imported safely without risking the introduction of BSE, and consequently did not include these imports as risk factors. This opinion is widely shared by experts having researched BSE (3, 4, 33, 40) .
The authors considered that ruminant protein other than MBM (including meat meal, bone meal and blood meal) does not constitute a risk factor as significant as MBM and have not taken them into account in assessing the release risk.
Release risk arising from the import of infected animals Figure 1 illustrates the scenario tree outlining the events and pathways which result in the release of infected MBM following the importation of live cattle. The authors assumed that the BSE agent is released when all of the following events occur:
-infected cattle are imported -the infected cattle are transformed into MBM -specified risk material (SRM) is not removed when infected animals are slaughtered -material containing SRM is not processed at 133ºC for 20 min. at 3 bar or with a method providing equivalent guarantees.
Regarding the last two events, coefficients were used to take into account the fact that SRM removal and rendering to the said standard do not absolutely guarantee removal and destruction of all BSE infectivity.
In Figure 1 , the first pathway commencing with the event that a BSE-infected animal is culled or dies is represented by the formula AB × S × (1 -COS) × R × (1 -COR). Combining all pathways leads to the following probability calculation:
-R), which can be simplified to (AB × [1 -S × COS] + RE) × (1 -R × COR).
Commencing with the event that infected cattle are imported, and converting the output into the weight of MBM, the release risk, expressed as the expected amount of infected MBM released following the importation of infected animals from any of 15 AN mn = number of live cattle imported from country m in the year n P mn = BSE prevalence in country m in the year n AB n = probability that an animal imported in the year n is sent to an abattoir S n = probability that SRM is removed from an animal COS = efficiency of SRM removal RE n = probability that an animal imported in the year n is sent to a rendering plant Release risk arising from the import of infected bonein carcass meat Figure 2 illustrates the scenario tree outlining the events and pathways which result in the release of infected MBM following the importation of meat products. The authors assumed that the BSE agent is released as the result of the importation of bone-in bovine meat, which may contain spinal cord and dorsal root ganglia, when all of the following events occur:
-bone-in meat of bovine origin from an infected animal is imported -the SRM is not removed from infected bone-in carcass meat -trimmings or scraps (bone, fat and SRM residues) generated from the bone-in carcass meat are sent for rendering into MBM -bone-in carcass meat sent to a rendering plant is not subjected to heating at 133ºC for 20 min. at 3 bar.
Regarding the second and the last events, coefficients are used to take into account the fact that SRM removal and heattreatment at 133ºC for 20 min. at 3 bar do not absolutely guarantee removal and destruction of all BSE infectivity. Meat products other than bone-in carcass meat are not assumed to constitute a risk factor as these products will not be rendered in any circumstances, while there is a chance that a significant proportion of bone-in meat (mainly bone and fat and possibly some SRM residue) is rendered.
In Figure 2 , the first pathway commencing with the event that SRM is removed is represented by the formula SME × (1 -COS) × SCR × R × (1 -COR). Combining all pathways leads to the following probability calculation: Commencing with the event that bone-in meat of bovine origin from an infected animal is imported, and converting the output into the weight of infected MBM, the release risk, expressed as the expected weight of infected MBM released following the importation of infected meat products from 17 countries in Europe between 1993 and 2000 (RR meat ) is estimated as follows:
MEAT mn = amount of bone-in meat of bovine origin imported from country m in the year n (metric tonnes [MT]) W MEAT = average weight of bone-in meat from one animal (kg) P mn = BSE prevalence in country m in the year n SCRn = probability of generating scraps or trimmings that are rendered into MBM SME mn = probability that SRM is removed from an animal in producing bone-in meat in country of origin m in the year n COS = efficiency of SRM removal R n = probability that an animal is rendered by heat-treatment at 133ºC for 20 min. at 3 bar in Japan in the year n COR = probability that heat-treatment at 133°C for 20 min. at 3 bar inactivates the BSE agent W MBM = average weight of MBM produced from bone-in meat from one animal (kg) M = 15 EU Member States, Switzerland and Liechtenstein 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000. Release risk arising from the import of infected meatand-bone meal -MBM from an infected animal is imported -the SRM was not removed from an animal rendered for the production of MBM -the MBM was not heat-treated at 133ºC for 20 min. at 3 bar.
Regarding the last two events, coefficients are used to take into account the fact that SRM removal and treatment by heating at 133ºC for 20 min. at 3 bar do not absolutely guarantee removal and destruction of all BSE infectivity.
In Figure 3 , the first pathway commencing with the event that SRM is removed is represented by the formula SMB × (1 -COS) × RMB × (1 -COR). Combining all pathways leads to the following probability calculation:
Commencing with the event that MBM from an infected animal is imported, and converting the output into the weight of infected MBM, the release risk, expressed as the expected weight of infected MBM released following the importation of infected MBM from 17 countries in Europe between 1993 and 2000 (RR mbm ) is estimated as follows:
MBM mn = amount of MBM (including bone meal, meat meal and blood meal) imported from country m in the year n (MT) W MBM = average weight of MBM from one animal (kg) P mn = BSE prevalence in country m in the year n SMBmn = probability that SRM is removed from an animal in producing MBM in country of origin m in the year n 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000.
The total release risk, expressed as the expected weight of infected MBM released following the importation of live animals, meat products and MBM in the past eight years was estimated by aggregating the amounts of MBM released through each scenario, as follows:
A stochastic model was employed to reflect the uncertainty of some of the values used for the input variables. The input variables were modelled as probability distributions and Monte Carlo simulation was used to combine the variables into an output distribution of probability estimates. The simulations were performed using @Risk software and an Excel 5.0 spreadsheet.
Five thousand iterations were run, and the results were summarised using percentile values, probability density and cumulative density functions.
Input variables
Import data of animals, bone-in meat and meat-andbone meal (AN mn , MEAT mn and MBM mn )
Import data of live cattle and bone-in meat from EU Member States, Switzerland and Liechtenstein between 1993 and 2000 used for estimation of the release risk are based on statistics issued by the custom authorities in Japan (1) . During this period, live cattle were imported only from Germany and France: sixteen animals were imported from Germany in 1993 and eight animals imported from France in 1998. The eight cattle imported from France in 1998 were all shipped back after being used for an exhibition and were therefore not considered in the release risk estimation. Import data of bone-in meat used for estimating the release risk are shown in Table I .
The MBM import data in Table II are based on Animal Quarantine Statistics issued by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) of Japan (19) , and are the aggregate of MBM, bone meal, meat meal and blood meal derived from cloven-hoofed animals. Although a substantial amount (835 MT) of bone meal was imported from Ireland between 1991 and 1998, these products were confirmed, based on records kept by the Animal Quarantine Service and the importers, to be bone-meal for human consumption, imported as supplementary food, or crushed bone for the production of gelatine (29) . The imports of bone meal from Ireland were therefore not taken into account in estimating the release risk.
Proportion of infective animals in countries in Europe (P mn ) Table III shows the proportion of infective animals used as input variables for the EU Member States from which any of the aforementioned products were imported into Japan between 1993 and 2000.
Although data is available from the OIE (World organisation for animal health) on the annual incidence of BSE in these countries between 1989 and 2001, these data are not reliable before 2001 when active surveillance was initiated in every EU Member State. The annual incidence of 2001 was therefore used to estimate the incidence in these countries in the preceding eight years. The apparent annual incidence of BSE in Denmark in 2001 was 6.77 per million cattle (34) . According to the Opinion of the Scientific Steering Committee of the European Commission (EC-SSC) on the geographical risk of BSE (GBR) in Denmark, the disease was prevalent in Denmark as early as in 1992 and would have increased until 1995 and then remained at the same level until 1997, decreasing slowly after that (9) . The authors therefore considered that they would not either underestimate or overestimate the true incidence of the disease if they assumed that this value was nil in 1991, but gradually increased reaching peak incidence in 1995-1997, which is two to five times higher than the apparent incidence in 2001 and most likely three times higher, and then gradually declined to the current incidence.
The apparent annual incidence of BSE in Italy in 2001 was 14.1 per million cattle (34) . According to the Opinion of the EC-SSC on the GBR of Italy, the disease may have been prevalent in the late 1980s, but the unstable domestic system was unable to stop the recycling of the agent, so disease incidence continued to increase until 1999 (12) . The authors therefore assumed that the true incidence started to exist in 1985 and increased at a constant rate to the peak incidence in 1999, which is two to five times higher than the apparent incidence in 2001 and most likely three times higher.
In France, the apparent annual incidence in 2001 was 19.7 per million cattle (34) . The EC-SSC estimates that BSE became prevalent in France in 1983 at the latest and peaked in 1996 when the SRM ban, fallen stock ban and extended feed ban were introduced (10) . The measures taken in 1997 (feed controls) and 1998 (improved rendering) induced a significant decline of the annual number of new BSE cases (10) . Based on this information, the authors assumed that the true incidence of BSE in France would have started to exist in 1983 and increased at a constant rate to the peak incidence in 1996, which is two to ten times higher than the apparent incidence in 2001 and most likely five times higher, and then decreased to the current level of incidence.
In the Netherlands, the apparent annual incidence in 2001 was 10.25 per million cattle (34) . According to the Opinion of the EC-SSC, BSE became prevalent in the Netherlands in the 1980s, continued to increase until 1995 and then started to decline due to the implementation of a 'stable' system: a BSE/cattle system which avoids processing infected cattle and recycling the BSE agent via the feed chain (13) . The authors therefore assumed that the true incidence of BSE in the Netherlands started to exist in 1985 and increased gradually to a peak in 1995, which is two to five times higher than the apparent incidence observed in 2001 and most likely three times higher, and then declined to the current level of incidence.
In Germany, the apparent annual incidence in 2001 was 19.97 per million cattle (34) . According to the EC-SSC, the cattle population of Germany was exposed to external challenges during the 1980s and the early 1990s and BSE infectivity was assumed to be amplified until 1996, after which year the anticipated amount of circulating BSE-infectivity is considered constant (11) . The authors therefore assumed that true BSE incidence in Germany started to exist in 1990 and reached a peak in 1996, which is one to three times higher than the apparent incidence observed in 2001 and most likely two times higher, and remained constant until 2000.
In Sweden, no cases of BSE had been detected at the time of writing this paper (34) . According to the EC-SSC, BSE is unlikely to have entered the country and should this have been the case, disease prevalence would have remained very low and decreased slowly since 1997 (14) . The authors therefore assumed the incidence of BSE in Sweden between 1993 and 2000 to be nil.
Triangular distributions were used to describe the uncertainty of these variables.
Since no data was available to differentiate between the proportion of infective animals among those intended for exportation, those that produce exported meat and those that produce exported MBM, a separate evaluation of the three proportions was impossible and the authors assumed that there is no difference between these categories. Since there is a close temporal association between the detection of infection and pathological changes in the central nervous system (37), the authors assumed that animals that are incubating the disease but have an infective load of the BSE agent too low to be positive to testing are devoid of infectivity, and that the true incidence, estimated as above, represents the proportion of infective animals.
Probability that an imported animal is sent to an abattoir in Japan in the year n (AB n ) Probability that an animal is sent to a rendering plant in Japan in the year n (RE n )
According to the MAFF, 88% of fallen stock is sent to a rendering plant, the remainder either being incinerated at a prefecture Livestock Hygiene Service Center or buried (26) . The authors therefore estimated the probability of an animal being sent to a rendering plant in Japan, by multiplying the number of fallen stock by 0.88 and dividing the value obtained by the aggregate of the number of cattle slaughtered and the number of fallen stock (156,639 × 0.88 ÷ [1,356,649 + 156,639] = 0.102).
Probability that specified risk material is removed from an animal in the year n in Japan (S n )
The authors assumed the probability that SRM is removed from an animal in Japan to be zero, as this was not practised in the country until October 2001.
Removal efficiency of specified risk materials (COS)
Prior to implementation of EC Regulation No. 270/2002 in 2002, vertebral columns containing dorsal root ganglia, which represent 3.8% of the total infective load of a BSE-affected animal (7), had never been designated as SRM and supposedly, had never been removed in any EU Member State other than the UK, even when the SRM ban was in force (5) . The authors therefore assumed that between 1992 and 2000, the efficiency of SRM removal in the EU Member States other than the UK was 96.2% (100% less 3.8%).
Probability that an animal is rendered at 133°C for 20 min. at 3 bar in Japan (R n )
According to the results of a survey conducted by the MAFF (2), the amount of MBM produced per annum is estimated to be 400,000 MT, of which 21,600 MT to 54,000 MT was subjected to heat-treatment at 133°C for 20 min. at 3 bar (5.4% to 13.4% of the total amount of MBM produced annually in Japan).
Probability that the bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent is inactivated by heating at 133°C for 20 min. at 3 bar (COR)
Riedinger proposes a reduction factor of 10 -5 to 10 -6 following heat-treatment at 133ºC for 20 min. at 3 bar (35), but in experiments using scrapie prions, Taylor et al. showed that the BSE agent is only inactivated by at least 10 2.8 fold (36) . To be on the safe side, treatment by heating at 133ºC for 20 min. at 3 bar was assumed to inactivate the BSE agent 10 2.8 fold.
Average amount of meat-and-bone meal produced from one animal (W mbm )
According to the results of a study on the return of rendering materials (16), a total of 200 kg of slaughter waste (65 kg of fat and 45 kg of bone and 90 kg of other organs and tissues) is produced as rendered raw materials from an adult bovine animal with a live weight of 630 kg. Based on data concerning the average composition of rendered raw materials and resulting products for a group of UK rendering and fat melting plants (8) , the return of mixed slaughter wastes for MBM was assumed to be 24%, and thus the average weight of MBM produced from one animal was estimated as 200 kg × 0.24 = 48 kg.
Average amount of bone-in meat produced from one animal (W meat )
The average weight of a bovine carcass in the 15 EU Member States from 1993 to 2000 was estimated using normal distribution based on data published by the EC (6, 15) .
Average amount of meat-and-bone meal produced from bone-in meat from one animal (W mbm ')
Assuming that bone-in meat generates trimmings and scraps composed of fat and bones (and no other organs) and that the returns of fat and bones for MBM are 4% and 45% respectively (8), the average amount of MBM produced from the bone-in meat of one animal was calculated as (65 kg of fat) × 0.04 + (45 kg of bones) × 0.45 = 22.9 kg.
Probability of generating scraps or trimmings that are rendered into meat-and-bone meal in Japan in the year n (SCR n )
As there is no data available for this probability, bone-in meat imported as half and quarter carcasses was assumed to generate scraps or trimmings that are rendered into MBM. The probability was estimated by dividing the amount of half and quarter carcasses by the total amount of bone-in meat imported in the study years (1), and assumed to follow a normal distribution.
Probability that specified risk material is removed from an animal in producing bone-in meat in the country of origin m in the year n (SME mn )
Between 1993 and 2000, animal quarantine authorities in Japan sampled 1,322 consignments from which SRM had supposedly been removed and found 45 consignments contaminated with this material. Based on this result, the authors used a beta distribution as the input variable for this probability.
Probability that specified risk material is removed from an animal when producing meat-and-bone meal in the country of origin m in the year n (SMB mn )
No requirements on the removal of SRM applied to the MBM exported from EU Member States to Japan. However, information on the introduction of SRM removal published in the Opinion of the EC-SSC on the GBR of the respective countries (9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14) was used to estimate this probability.
In Denmark, no SRM ban was imposed until March 2000, therefore SRM was assumed not to have been removed from the animals when producing MBM in Denmark until March 2000.
In the Netherlands, the SRM ban was not properly implemented until the end of 1998. Therefore, SRM was assumed not to have been removed until the end of 1998, but removed in 1999 and 2000.
In France, a SRM ban was first introduced in April 1996, but implementation of the ban posed problems and in July 1998, enforcement was found to be irregular (10) . The authors therefore assumed that SRM was removed from animals producing MBM only after 1999.
In Italy, no SRM ban was implemented except for cattle imported from countries with an incidence of BSE between 1993 and 2000. In Germany, SRM was removed only from cattle imported from countries where a SRM ban was in place on a voluntary basis. Therefore, SRM was assumed not to have been removed from animals producing MBM in Italy and Germany between 1993 and 2000.
For all the countries, the authors assumed that the SRM ban, when implemented, was 90% to 99.9% effective and most likely 99%.
Probability that an animal is rendered at 133°C for 20 min. at 3 bar when producing meat-and-bone meal in the country of origin m in the year n (RMB mn )
The MAFF of Japan required that MBM imported from EU Member States be subjected to heat-treatment at 133°C for 20 min. at 3 bar (17). However, six out of 202 consignments of MBM exported to Japan from Italy did not comply with this standard. Therefore, the authors considered that although such treatment was required under animal health requirements and compliance with this requirement was confirmed by accompanying health certificates on arrival in Japan, the probability that the MBM in fact underwent this treatment was not 100%. Based on the experience of the imports from Italy, the authors assumed that this probability is 97% at minimum, 99% at maximum and most likely 98%.
Values for these input variables and their probability distributions are shown in Tables I, II , III, IV and V.
Results
Simulation based on five thousand iterations using the model and input variables described above produced a release risk, Figure 4 show the amount of MBM released in Japan under different scenarios. Apparently, importation of MBM resulted in the highest release risk factor, while importation of live cattle and bone-in carcass meat appears to constitute a lesser risk of release.
Discussions and conclusion
Cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy detected in Japan
Five cases of BSE have been detected in Japan at the time of writing this paper. The first case was detected on 10 September 2001, from a brain sample of a five-year old dairy cow with ataxia slaughtered on 6 August 2001 at an abattoir in the Chiba-prefecture, east of Tokyo. The other four cases, without clinical signs, were also dairy cows found to be infected as the result of BSE testing using prion protein technology conducted at abattoirs. The details and geographical locations of these five cases are shown in Table VII and Figure 5 , respectively.
The MAFF had taken various preventive measures even before the first case of BSE was detected in Japan in September 2001. These consisted of an import ban on live cattle from countries with a high incidence of BSE, SRM removal from meat products from countries with an incidence of BSE, importation of MBM Probability that an animal is sent to an abattoir in Japan in year n (AB n ) 89.6% Point
Probability that an animal is sent to a rendering plant in Japan in year n (RE n ) 10.2% Point Probability that SRM is removed from an animal in Japan (S n ) 0.0% Point If an infected animal is equivalent to 8,000 oral cattle infectivity doses (ID 50 ) (as assumed by the EC-SSC [7] ), the infected MBM possibly released in Japan between 1993 and 2000 was equivalent to 3,920 ID 50 -8,967 ID 50 (this would have infected a maximum of 3,920-8,967 animals if there were no exposure control and the infected MBM was evenly distributed to this number of cattle). The exposure assessment remains to be completed to estimate the possible number of cattle infected during this period.
Exposure assessment
Before the first case of BSE was detected in September 2001, the MAFF presumed that controls on the use of ruminant MBM in ruminant feed were effectively enforced according to administrative instructions issued by the Ministry on 17 April 1996. This presumption was supported by the fact that no breach of instructions had been observed during on-the-spot inspections of feed mills by the National Fertilizer and Feed Inspection Stations (NFFIS). During these inspections, inspectors from the NFFIS checked production records and sampled cattle feed for microscopic examination to ensure that the MBM in ruminant feed was not contaminated.
Regarding the possibility of cross-contamination and crossfeeding at farm level between cattle, pig and chicken feed, the MAFF was of the view then that there is little chance that this would occur in Japan for three reasons, as follows:
-co-farming of ruminants and non-ruminants is not a common practice in Japan. In February 2000, of the 33,328 dairy farms and 106,101 beef cattle farms in Japan, 116 dairy farms (0.03%) and 847 beef farms (0.8%) also had nonruminant animals (20) -there is no economic advantage in using MBM for cattle feed as a substitute for plant protein supplements as the price difference between animal protein (including MBM) and vegetable protein (soya) is negligible -in Japan, farmers do not usually keep MBM on their premises and prepare home-mixed feed.
In addition, before the administrative instruction was issued on 17 April 1996, the MAFF had considered that the quantities of MBM fed to cattle was negligible: the amount used before that date as raw material for the production of cattle compound feed was 99 MT to 247 MT annually, representing less than 0.05% of the total amount of MBM used for feed (Table VIII) .
However, on-site inspections of all cattle farms in Japan by prefecture veterinary inspectors in September 2001 after detection of the first case of BSE revealed that 165 cattle farms in fifteen prefectures were feeding some processed animal proteins (mainly MBM, blood meal or steamed bone meal) to a total of 5,129 cattle (22, 23) . These animal proteins were fed as supplements, mainly on dairy farms. At the time of writing this 
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Geographical locations of the five cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy detected in Japan paper, none of these farms had experienced a case of BSE. Considering the sensitivity of the microscopic examinations and the fact that some feed mills were found to produce ruminant and non-ruminant feed on the same production line, the possibility of cross-contamination cannot be excluded. To complete the exposure assessment, additional information should be obtained on the feeding histories of animals on these farms as well as details on cross-contamination and crossfeeding between 1993 and 2000.
Possible sources of infection
Immediately after the first case of BSE was detected in September 2001, the MAFF organised an investigation team to identify the source of infection, assuming that the agent was introduced into Japan and exposed to the infected cows between 1996 and early 1998. Considering the fact that the five infected cows were all born between December 1995 and April 1996 and that susceptibility in cattle peaks between 0.5 to 1.5 years of age (39), the MAFF assumed that these cows had been most susceptible in 1996 and 1997. The MAFF has concluded in an interim report that the following two possibilities cannot be ruled out with regard to the five cases:
-contamination with MBM, possibly by feed crosscontaminated in feed mills with MBM imported from Italy in November 1996, which had not been heat-treated at 133°C/20 min./3 bar -use of contaminated animal fat (powdered animal fat imported from the Netherlands between 1995 and May 1996) in feed for cattle and in milk replacers for calves.
In addition to the possibilities mentioned above, the fact that the BSE agent may have entered Japan through cattle imported from the UK in the 1980s, from Germany in 1993, from MBM imported from countries in Europe before 1995 and that the source of infection may have been MBM from Japan could not be completely excluded, and more information on this subject needs to be collected in future. Judging from the geographical locations of the five cases detected, more than one batch of MBM was assumed to be contaminated with the BSE agent. Although adult exposure is a possibility ( The experience in countries in Europe shows that these investigations rarely result in successful identification of the source of infection. In addition to addressing the specifics of the BSE cases detected to date, further investigations and assessment of the risk factors that might have played a role in introducing and propagating the disease should be conducted. This would allow identification of the measures to be taken to prevent the BSE agent from entering into the feed chain, even in the absence of any clear link to imported products.
Animal health and public health measures taken in Japan
The measures taken to protect animal and public health from BSE in Japan are shown in chronological order in Table IX . Following detection of the first case of BSE, the Government of Japan, mainly the MAFF and the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW), introduced the measures described below to prevent the agent from entering the food and feed chains. d) The MHLW recommended that domestic food industries use materials that do not contain SRM originating from countries with an incidence of BSE and that all products containing SRM be recalled (30) .
e) A legal ban on the domestic use of ruminant protein for ruminant feed was implemented on 18 September 2001 (25), followed by a ban on the domestic use and import of all processed animal proteins for the production of feed for ruminants, pigs and chickens and fertiliser, effective from 4 October 2001. To ensure compliance and to prevent crosscontamination, the MAFF has instructed feed mills to apply flushing or to use a different line to produce ruminant feed. The mills are subjected to regular visits by inspectors of the NFFIS, who take samples for microscopic examination and laboratory tests such as the polymerase chain reaction and ELISA tests (domestic use of pig and chicken meal for fertiliser and pet food, and chicken meal and powdered pig plasma for pig and chicken feed has been allowed since 1 November 2001, and domestic use of steamed bone meal as fertiliser has been allowed under certain conditions) (21).
f) Animal identification systems have been introduced, which will enable back-tracing to the farm of origin to access other relevant information from the bar code on the ear tag of each individual animal. Almost all of the 4.5 million cattle in Japan had been ear tagged under this system by the end of March 2002 (27) .
The Government of Japan introduced these measures in the six months following detection of the first case of BSE, a relatively short time compared to most of the EU Member States. Assuming these measures continue to be appropriately implemented, the probability that cattle are (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE agent will continue to decrease over time. However, the experience in Europe shows that measures prescribed by law and regulations are not always completely implemented. Early establishment of an effective surveillance network, including active surveillance targeted at risk animals, is essential to monitor the effectiveness of these measures as well as to estimate the possible year when the BSE agent entered Japan.
The release assessment model outlined in this paper is based on the assumption that importation of live cattle, bone-in carcass meat and MBM between 1993 and 2000 are the risk factors. If evidence is found to support the hypothesis that the BSE agent entered Japan more than eight years ago, the model described will have to be reconstructed so as to accommodate the risk relating to domestic sources of the agent. This precaution should also apply when using the model to determine the BSE status of another country. The model can be applied to assess the BSE status of a country only when there is no possibility that the agent entered into the country more than eight years ago. Furthermore, the release assessment model outlined in this paper only considers the importation of live cattle, bone-in carcass meat and MBM as risk factors. If any release risk factors other than these, such as imported animal fat, proved to be important, the model will have to be reconstructed to take account of these risk factors as well. 
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Modelo para determinar el riesgo de introducción en Japón del agente de la encefalopatía espongiforme bovina a través de animales, carne y harinas de carne y huesos de importación K. Sugiura, K. Ito, R. Yokoyama, S. Kumagai & T. Onodera
Resumen
Los autores elaboraron un modelo matemático para determinar el riesgo de liberación en un país del agente de la encefalopatía espongiforme bovina (EEB) a resultas de la importación de ganado vivo, carne bovina no desosada o harinas de carne y huesos procedentes del Reino Unido o de algún otro país afectado por la enfermedad. Utilizando ese modelo e incorporándole una serie de variables se intentó aplicar la simulación de Montecarlo. Se estimó que el riesgo de penetración del agente en Japón, expresado como el peso de harinas infectadas que entraron en el país entre 1993 y 2000, se situaba entre 23,4 y 53,8 kg. La simulación puso también de manifiesto que las harinas importadas constituían el I principal factor de riesgo de penetración del agente de la EBB en Japón. Los autores ofrecen también información sobre los cinco primeros casos de EEB detectados en Japón entre septiembre de 2001 y finales de 2002, y exponen a grandes líneas los resultados de la investigación para determinar el origen de la infección, así como las medidas adoptadas por el Gobierno japonés para impedir que el agente infeccioso penetrara en la cadena alimentaria y en el circuito de producción de piensos.
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